Both monopoly and unfair competition are anti-competition behaviors of business operators that violate trade order and code of business ethics. They have a double whammy for the market, not only undermining the normal market competition but also prejudicing the interests of other business operators as well as consumers. Monopoly limits the freedom of business operators that compete in the market and therefore, destroys the competition itself. Meanwhile unfair competition undermines the fair order of competition. The aforementioned commonalities and differences lead to the concurrence between the Anti-Monopoly Law and Anti-Unfair Competition Law in one hand and their different focusses in the other hand, explaining why the draft amendment to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (the Draft) announced by the Legislative Affair Office of the State Council in February 2016 has attracted wide attention of anti-monopoly fraternity.1. Introduction of relatively dominant position
Article 6 of the Draft, which could be the provision mostly affecting anti-monopoly area, provides that a business operator shall not use its relatively dominant position to restrict its counterparty’s transaction objects, commodities, terms and conditions with others without justifiable reasons; request excessive fees; unreasonably request other economic benefits from its counterparty; or attach any other unreasonable trade terms. Relatively dominant position refers to the dominant position of a business operator in a specific transaction in terms of funds, technologies, market entry, sales channel, procurement of materials etc. on which the counterparty depends and is not able to turn to other business operators. In light of the definition, relatively dominant position shows concurrence with dominant market position as both of them emphasise the market power of the business operator. For example, a business operator with relatively dominant position normally possesses the advantages in funds, technology and market entry, while determination of dominant market position would consider the business operator’s financial and technical capabilities and the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market. Moreover, the two positions share a concurrent key criteria which is the dependency of the counterparty on the business operator. In spite of the aforementioned concurrence, the relatively dominant position has a lower threshold compared to the dominant market position. To determine dominant market position requires, first of all, identifying the relevant market and then considering the competition status of the relevant market and proving the market share of the business operator with monopoly behaviors. In practice it is quite burdensome for the counterparty seeking protection under the Anti-Monopoly Law to identify relevant market and prove market share. However, relatively dominant position does not require the identification of the relevant market or market share but focusses on ‘relatively’, underlining the market power comparison between the business operator and its counterparty in a specific transaction. Therefore, theoretically, the lower threshold of relatively dominant position may reduce the cost of counterparty seeking protection and remedy.
2. Deletion of regulations on certain monopoly behaviors
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law was promulgated in 1993, 14 years earlier than the Anti-Monopoly Law. The Anti-Unfair Competition Law covers some monopoly behaviors emerged at that time in order to respond to the then demands for regulatory compliance. For example, Article 11 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law prohibits business operators from selling commodities at prices below cost with the intention of defeating competitors. Such prohibition overlaps with predatory pricing prohibited by the Anti-Monopoly Law. Thus, to streamline the legislations and minimise the conflict with the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Draft deleted four monopoly behaviors, including public utilities or other certified monopolies to restrict its counterparty’s commodity purchasing, administrative monopoly, bundle or unreasonable trade terms and selling under cost. It is noteworthy that, except for administrative monopoly, the other three monopoly behaviors are deemed as acts of abuse of dominant market position under the Anti-Monopoly Law. In addition, other monopoly behaviors overlapping with the Anti-Monopoly Law such as collusive bidding has not been deleted by the Draft.
3. Other attractions
Besides the above, the Draft also added provisions regulating unfair competition behaviors in network applications service. Article 13 of the Draft stipulates that business operators shall not use network technologies to prevent its users from using network application service of others without users’ prior consent, to force users to skip to other links inserted without prior permission or authorisation, to disturb or destroy network applications service provided by others without prior permission or authorisation, or to mislead, cheat, force users to modify, close, download network applications service. Unfair competition behaviors in network application service used to be regulated under Article 2 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the equality and fairness principle, of which the standards are ambiguous and controversial. Such new additions in the Draft, a legislative response to the widely focussed dispute between Tencent and Qihoo 360, highlights the technology development and corresponding legal practice change in recent years.
反壟斷視角下的《反不正當競爭法》修改草案送審稿
壟斷和不正當競爭行為都是市場經營者在市場競爭過程中違反交易秩序、商業道德准則所實施的反競爭行為，它們均具有雙重損害性，既損害正常的市場競爭，也損害其它經營者和消費者的利益。壟斷行為破壞自由競爭本身，限制經營者在市場上自由參與競爭的權利﹔不正當競爭破壞的是公平的市場競爭秩序，從而損害合法經營者和消費者的權益。壟斷和不正當競爭行為的共性和區別使《反壟斷法》與《反不正當競爭法》之間既有競合，又各有側重。有鑒於此，2016年2月國務院法制辦公室公布的《反不正當競爭法》修改草案送審稿（“送審稿”），引起了反壟斷界的廣泛關注。本文將對送審稿對反壟斷領域的影響進行解讀。
1. 引入相對優勢地位，降低交易相對方的維權成本。
送審稿第6條對反壟斷領域影響最大，第6條規定，經營者不得利用相對優勢地位，無正當理由限定交易相對方的交易對象、購買產品、與其他經營者的交易條件，不得濫收費用或不合理地要求交易相對方提供其他經濟利益，以及不得附加其他不合理的交易條件。此條在行為模式上部分借鑒了《反壟斷法》第17條禁止具有市場支配地位的經營者濫用市場支配地位的行為，但在主體限定上引入了“具有相對優勢地位”這一概念。相對優勢地位在送審稿中被定義為“具體交易過程中，交易一方在資金、技術、市場准入、銷售渠道、原材料採購等方面處於優勢地位，交易相對方對該經營者具有依賴性，難以轉向其他經營者”。從文義上看，相對優勢地位與市場支配地位既有相似，又有區別。首先相對優勢地位與市場支配地位都強調企業自身的市場地位和實力，如相對優勢地位要求交易一方在資金、技術、市場准入等方面處於優勢地位，而反壟斷法在認定市場支配地位時，也需考慮經營者的財力和技術條件以及其他經營者進入相關市場的難易程度。同時，相對優勢地位和市場支配地位的重要判斷標准之一均為交易相對方對經營者的依賴性。但是，相較市場支配地位，相對優勢地位的定義較為寬鬆。首先，在認定市場支配地位時，通常要求先確定相關市場，考慮相關市場的競爭狀況以及經營者在相關市場的市場份額。然而，相關市場的判定及經營者市場份額的証明難度較大，這常常導致實踐中証明經營者具有市場支配地位困難重重。而送審稿在判定相對優勢地位時並未要求對相關市場進行明確定義和論証。相對優勢地位將重點放在相對二字上，著重強調在具體交易中，經營者與交易相對方之間的市場地位對比。由此可見，理論上《反不正當競爭法》對相對優勢地位的標准較為寬鬆，可能有助於交易相對方降低維權成本。
2. 刪除部分由反壟斷法規制的不正當競爭行為，進一步協調與反壟斷法的關系。
我國《反不正當競爭法》的頒布早於《反壟斷法》，為適應當時經濟發展的要求，《反不正當競爭法》自然地規制了當時經濟社會中已經出現的壟斷行為，如公用企業或者其他具有獨佔性地位的經營者限定他人購買指定商品等行為。這一行為其實就是《反壟斷法》規定的“濫用市場支配地位”的壟斷行為之一。又如，《反不正當競爭法》禁止政府及其所屬部門濫用行政權力，指定交易或限制競爭，這其實是《反壟斷法》第8條規制的“行政壟斷行為”。《反不正當競爭法》第11條規定的禁止經營者以低於成本的價格銷售實際上與《反壟斷法》禁止的掠奪性定價行為重合，第12條規定的禁止搭售或者附加其他不合理條件與《反壟斷法》規定的濫用市場支配地位行為中的搭售行為競合。本次送審稿刪除了禁止公用企業指定交易、禁止濫用行政權力、禁止低於成本銷售和禁止搭售這四種可以由《反壟斷法》規制的反競爭行為，進一步協調與《反壟斷法》的關系。值得注意的是，除了行政壟斷外，上述行為在《反壟斷法》下均是濫用市場支配地位的行為表現之一。除此以外，我們還注意到對於其他與《反壟斷法》競合的行為，如《反不正當競爭法》禁止的串通投標行為，送審稿並未刪除。
3. 其它亮點
此外，《反不正當競爭法》還新增了有關網絡服務不正當競爭行為的規定。送審稿第13條規定，未經用戶同意，經營者不得通過技術手段阻止用戶正常使用其他經營者的網絡應用服務，不得在其他經營者提供的網絡應用中插入鏈接實行強制跳轉，不得誤導、欺騙、強迫用戶修改、關閉、卸載或者不能正常使用他人合法提供的網絡應用服務，經營者不得未經許可，干擾或者破壞他人合法提供的網絡應用服務。網絡不正當競爭行為原本隻能通過《反不正當競爭法》第2條的原則性規定加以規制，送審稿的本次完善回應了近年沸沸揚揚的騰訊360之爭，更反映了技術進步和市場實踐變化。
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