The National Development and Reform Commission published the Guidelines for Commitments by Business Operators in Anti-trust Cases (the Guidelines for Commitments) (draft for comment) to solicit public opinions on February 3, 2016.The Anti-Monopoly Law only provides general regulations on the circumstance where a business operator makes a commitment during the investigation. According to article 45 of the AML, if the business operator being investigated promises to eliminate the effects of the conduct through use of concrete measures within the time limit accepted by the enforcement agency, the agency may suspend the investigation. If the business operator fulfils the commitment, the agency may terminate the investigation. But the AML does not further regulate on the issue.
Applicability of commitments
It is notable that the applicability of commitments is clearly defined in this draft. The Guidelines for Commitments exclude hardcore cartels from being eligible to make a commitment – i.e. in cases of horizontal monopoly regarding fixing or changing commodity price, restricting output or sales volume, and dividing sales or raw materials market. It should be noted that horizontal activities of “restricting new technology or new product” and “jointly boycotting transactions”, while also listed under article 13 of the AML, are not covered by the exclusionary rule above. In anti-trust cases not mentioned in the exclusionary rule, if a business operator volunteers to make a commitment, the agency may suspend or terminate the investigation.
Timing of making a commitment
The enforcement agencies do not regulate on the exact timing of a commitment. For example, pursuant to the NDRC’s procedural regulation, a business operator may apply for suspension of investigation during “the time period of investigation”; the State Administration for Industry and Commerce provides similar rule in its departmental regulation; with respect to M&A filings, the MOFCOM provides that a business operator may propose restrictive conditions on their transactional plan “during the review process” to eliminate or weaken the anti-competition effects. In comparison, the Guidelines for Commitments provide that a business operator may make a commitment at any stage after the investigation starts but before the preliminary notification of administrative penalty is rendered; however, if the enforcement agency already confirms the activity as monopoly through investigation, it should render a decision instead of accepting a commitment.
A business operator may withdraw its commitment, but it will lead to the agency’s resume of investigation and refusal to accept new commitment.
Content of a commitment
The Guidelines for Commitments classify commitments as behavioral, structural or a combination of both. Behavioral measures refer to granting access to infrastructures such as network or platform, licensing patents, trade secrets or other IP rights, terminating exclusivity agreements, etc.; structural measures refer to strip-off of tangible assets, intangible assets such as IP rights or other interests and benefits. Such classification obviously learns from the category of and regulations on restrictive conditions in the MOFCOM’s regulation on merger review.
According to the requirements of the Guidelines for Commitments, measures of a commitment should be concrete, feasible and can be carried out by the business operator itself. If the performance requires consent from a third party, the business operator should also submit the third party’s consent in writing.
The commitment should be made in writing, and the agency will carry out a preliminary review within one month upon the receipt of the commitment.
Performance of a commitment
The time limit for a business operator to perform its commitment is case-specific and decided by the enforcement agency, generally from six months to three years. Under special circumstance it may be extended to no longer than five years. The agency may suspend the investigation upon its approval of the commitment and supervise the business operator in respect of its performance. Once the commitment is fulfilled and the consequence of the activities is eliminated, the agency should terminate the investigation and render a written decision accordingly. If the business operator fails to fulfill its commitment, the agency should resume investigation and refuse to accept further commitment. The business operator may be given heavier punishment according to law if its activities are considered monopolistic.
In addition to the Guidelines for Commitments, the NDRC also publishes the Application Guidelines for Leniency Polices in Cases of Horizontal Agreement (the Guidelines for Leniency) (draft for comment) on the same day. The Guidelines for Leniency encourage business operators to communicate with agencies before applying for leniency treatment on either an anonymous or real-name basis. The Guidelines for Leniency also set forth conditions to receive leniency treatment: the business operator is, in addition to submitting an application for leniency, obliged to cease the suspected illegal activities in a timely manner, cooperate with the investigation, preserve and provide evidence, maintain confidentiality and not obstruct enforcement actions. The Guidelines for Leniency limits the number of business operators eligible for leniency to three in one case, while the “organiser” and “activist” of monopoly agreement generally cannot be granted immunity.
There are several anti-trust guidelines currently being drafted or soliciting public comments, which play a positive role in increasing the transparency in enforcement actions and to certain extent will limit the exercise of discretion by the agencies. However, it should be noted that the guidelines are merely behavioral instructions rather than regulations, and the content is still likely subject to change before the drafts are finalised.
反垄断执法机构为经营者承诺做出指引
根据国务院反垄断委员会的工作计划，国家发改委起草了《反垄断案件经营者承诺指南》（《承诺指南》）征求意见稿，并於2月3日向社会公开征求意见。
《反垄断法》对经营者在调查过程中进行承诺的情况进行了原则性规定。根据《反垄断法》第四十五条，对反垄断执法机构调查的涉嫌垄断行为，被调查的经营者承诺在反垄断执法机构认可的期限内采取具体措施消除该行为后果的，反垄断执法机构可以决定中止调查。经营者履行承诺的，反垄断执法机构可以决定终止调查。但是《反垄断法》并未对经营者承诺做进一步规定。
承诺的适用范围
《承诺指南》对经营者提出承诺的程序与实体相关事宜均提出了指导意见，其中引人注意的是对承诺制度的适用范围进行了明确界定。《承诺指南》排除了核心卡特尔适用承诺制度的可能性——对於固定或变更商品价格、限制商品生产或销售数量、分割销售市场或原材料采购市场的横向垄断协议案件，执法机构。
应接受经营者提出的承诺，实施中止调查。应当注意，《反垄断法》第十叁条中同属横向协议的“限制购买新技术、新设备或者限制开发新技术、新产品”以及“联合抵制交易”并不在上述排除规定之中。对於排除规定之外的其他反垄断案件，经营者主动提出承诺，执法机构可以决定适用中止调查及终止调查程序。
提出承诺的时机
反垄断执法机构对於经营者提出承诺的时间并无确切规定。例如，根据国家发改委《反价格垄断行政执法程序规定》第十五条，经营者在“被调查期间”可以提出中止调查的申请；国家工商总局《工商行政管理机关查处垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位案件程序规定》第十五条也有类似的规定；对於并购，商务部《经营者集中审查办法》第十一条规定，经营者可以在“审查过程中”对集中交易方案提出限制性条件以消除或减少排除、限制竞争的效果。相比之下，《承诺指南》对承诺的提出时间进行了更详细的规定——在调查开始后、做出行政处罚事先告知前的任何阶段，经营者都可以提出承诺，申请中止调查；执法机构对涉嫌垄断行为调查核实后，认为构成垄断行为的，应当依法作出处理决定，不再接受经营者提出的承诺。
执法经营者可以撤回承诺，但这将导致执法机构恢复调查，并不再接受经营者提出的承诺。
承诺的内容
国家发改委和国家工商总局在其部门规章中并未对承诺的具体内容进行规范。《承诺指南》将经营者承诺的内容分为行为性、结构性或是二者相结合的措施。行为性措施包括开放网络或者平台等基础设施，许可专利、技术秘密或者其他知识产权，终止排他性协议等；结构性措施包括剥离有形资产、知识产权等无形资产或者相关权益等。这一分类方式明显借鉴了商务部《经营者集中审查办法》以及《关於经营者集中附加限制性条件的规定（试行）》对限制性条件的分类与规定。
根据《承诺指南》的要求，承诺措施应当是明确、可行且可以自主实施的。如果实施承诺措施需要第叁方同意，经营者还应当提交第叁方同意的书面意见。
提出承诺、申请中止调查应当以书面形式为之，执法机构一般应当在收到申请后的一个月内，就案件是否适宜中止调查、经营者申请的时间、方式等进行初步审查，并将审查结果书面告知经营者。
承诺的履行
经营者履行承诺的期限由执法机构根据案情决定，一般为六个月至叁年。特殊情况下可以延长，但是最长不超过五年。执法机构对承诺认可后，可以中止调查，并对经营者履行承诺的情况进行监督。经营者履行承诺，已经消除行为后果的，执法机构应当终止调查，并制作终止调查决定书。经营者未履行承诺，执法机关应当恢复调查，并不再接受经营者的承诺。如果认定经营者的行为系垄断行为，可以依法从重处罚。
除了上述《承诺指南》以外，国家发改委还在同日公布了《横向垄断协议案件宽大制度适用指南》（《宽大指南》）的征求意见稿。与《承诺指南》相似，《宽大指南》对宽大制度适用过程中的程序和实体问题进行了解释。例如，执法机构鼓励经营者在申请宽大前以匿名或实名与执法机构进行沟通。又如，《宽大指南》对经营者取得宽大的条件进行了列举：经营者除了提交宽大申请外，还有义务及时停止涉嫌违法行为、配合调查、保存和提供证据、保密，并且不得妨碍执法。在宽大的适用对象方面，《宽大指南》规定一般情况下在同一垄断协议案件中最多给予叁个经营者宽大；指南还借鉴了国家工商总局的做法，规定垄断协议的“组织者”和“积极分子”一般不适用免除处罚，但是可以相应减轻处罚。
反垄断执法机构目前正在制定或征求意见的反垄断指南已有多部，这些指南对於提高执法透明度、在一定程度上限制执法机构行使自由裁量权具有积极作用。但是应当注意，指南仅是行动指引而非法律规定，而且其内容在定稿之前仍有变动可能。
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