Illegal per se and the rule of reason are tools commonly used in anti-trust analysis. Chapter 3 (abuse of market dominance) of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of China clearly reflects the rule of reason, while it has always been controversial whether illegal per se exists under the AML. Although Article 13 (horizontal agreement) and Article 14 (vertical agreement) of the AML prohibit certain types of monopolistic agreements, Article 15 has set up a safe harbour to excuse those monopolistic agreements which fall within the scope of Article 13 and Article 14 but at the same time meet certain conditions. This has created a circumstance in which it is inevitable that the rationality of monopolistic agreements is investigated when determining the legality of such agreement. As a result, some scholars opine that illegal per se does not exist under the AML. Compared with the rule of reason, applying illegal per se brings the following effects: from the perspective of enforcement, the enforcement agencies are able to declare a monopolistic conduct as illegal upon the confirmation of its mere existence without further going into the purpose and consequence thereof and; from the perspective of judiciary, the plaintiff’s threshold of evidence will be largely reduced in anti-trust litigation, and it will be no longer helpful for the defendant to submit evidence proving the rationality of its monopolistic conduct. Considering the existence of the safe harbour clause, even though there is illegal per se under the AML, it would only be deemed as a legislative assumption, which can be defeated by Article 15. Vertical agreement under the AML generally refers to resale price maintenance. Judged from the regulations on the burden of evidence in applicable judicial interpretation, it seems that the rule of reason will apply when determining the legality of a vertical agreement. In the draft of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct, Article 7 originally provided that: “The victim who suffered from the activities of monopolistic agreement should bear the burden of producing evidence to prove that the alleged monopolistic agreement restricts or eliminates competition. Where the alleged monopolistic conduct is a monopolistic agreement as described in Article 13.1(1)-(5) and Article 14 (1) and (2), the victim need not prove that such agreement restricts or eliminates competition, unless the monopolistic actor being sued produces evidence to the contrary which suffices to overturn [the assumption].” However, upon the enactment of the Provisions in June 2012, Article 7 is changed to the following: “Where the alleged monopolistic conduct is a monopolistic agreement as described in Article 13.1(1)-(5) of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the defendant shall assume the burden to prove that the agreement does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” The underlined content of vertical agreement was deleted. The change indicates that the Supreme Court sees vertical agreement different from horizontal agreement in that the former’s existence is not self-incriminating. The plaintiff should still prove that such agreement eliminates or restricts competition. Though the regulation only relates to the burden of evidence, it implies what criterion the Supreme Court applies when determining the legality of vertical agreement. It is regretful that such standard cannot be met by most plaintiffs (usually distributors) in a case involving vertical agreement: first, the plaintiff is at the downstream market, who may have some knowledge about the local distribution market where it is located but usually lacks knowledge of the upstream market of the defendant; second, the market power and capability of the plaintiff are far inferior to those of the defendant, otherwise the defendant will not be able to control the plaintiff through the vertical agreement, which means the plaintiff lacks the ability to analyse the market and collect the data. 纵向协议:本身违法,还是合理原则?(上) 本身违法原则和合理原则是反垄断分析中常用的工具。中国《反垄断法》第三章(滥用市场支配地位)明确体现了合理原则,但是对于《反垄断法》下是否存在本身违法原则一直存在争议。虽然《反垄断法》第十三条(横向协议)、第十四条(纵向协议)禁止某些类型的垄断协议,但在第十五条又确立了“避风港”规则,对虽然符合第十三条、第十四条适用范围但又满足特定条件的垄断协议予以豁免。这就造成了对垄断协议的合法性进行判断时,不可避免要对该协议的合理性进行探讨。因此,有学者认为《反垄断法》没有本身违法原则。 与合理原则相比,适用本身违法原则会产生以下效果:从执法的角度来讲,执法机关只需认定垄断行为的存在就可以认定该行为违法,而无需进一步考察其目的和效果;从司法的角度来讲,反垄断诉讼中原告的举证门槛大幅降低,而被告提供其垄断行为具有合理性的证据将不再有帮助。考虑到避风港条款的存在,《反垄断法》下即使存在本身违法原则,也只能视为一种立法推定,而且该推定可以被第十五条所推翻。 《反垄断法》下的纵向协议主要指转售价格維持。从有关司法解释对举证责任的规定看,判断纵向协议的合法性似乎应当适用合理原则。在最高人民法院《关于审理因垄断行为引发的民事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定》的草案中,第七条原本规定如下: “垄断协议行为的受害人应对被诉垄断协议具有排除、限制竞争的效果承担举证责任。被诉垄断行为属于反垄断法第十三条第一款第(一)项至第(五)项和第十四条第(一)项、第(二)项规定的情形的,受害人无需对该协议具有排除、限制竞争的效果举证证明,但被诉垄断行为人有相反证据足以推翻的除外。” 但是,上述《规定》在2012年6月正式实施时,第七条被修改为: “被诉垄断行为属于反垄断法第十三条第一款第(一)项至第(五)项规定的垄断协议的,被告应对该协议不具有排除、限制竞争的效果承担举证 下划线标示的纵向协议内容被删除。这一变化表明最高法院认为纵向协议与横向协议不同,其存在本身不足以自证其违法性。原告还应当证明该协议具有排除、限制竞争的效果。虽然该规定只涉及举证责任,但其中暗示了最高法院在考察纵向协议合法性时所适用的标准。遗憾的是,这样的要求对绝大多数纵向协议案件的原告(通常为经销商)来说不可能达到:第一,原告处于被告的下游市场,虽然对其自身所处的本地经销市场有一定认识,但对被告所处的上游市场往往缺乏了解;第二,原告的市场力量和能力远远弱于被告,否则被告不可能通过纵向协议对原告进行控制,这就意味着原告不具有被告那样的市场分析和数据收集能力。 |
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